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THE CURIOUS CAREER OF LAWFARE 
Wouter G. Werner*  
This article discusses some different uses of the term „lawfare‟ since 
the 1970‟s. The main aim of the article is to explore how particular ways of 
framing the concept of “lawfare” affect questions of legal, moral, and polit-
ical accountability. In particular, the article contrasts the way in which the 
term „lawfare‟ has been used in critical theory with the instrumentalization 
of the term in neoconservative thinking. While critical theory has used the 
term to rethink questions of accountability and to spur a process of self-
critique, neoconservative thinking has mainly used to term to  discredit an 
opponent‟s reliance on law and legal procedure. This has turned the use of 
the term „lawfare‟ itself into a strategic move—a move that could eventually 
undermine the integrity of law.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When I accepted the invitation to contribute to this conference, I 
only had a general idea what lawfare was about. At the time I thought that 
―lawfare‖ mainly stood for the way in which states, the military, and in-
fluential non-profit organizations used international law to legitimise and 
critique the use of military force—that lawfare signified, in David Kenne-
dy‘s words, the art of ―managing law and war together.‖1 I was soon to dis-
cover that this is not how most people use the term nowadays, in particular 
in circles that are critical of the way in which international law sets limits to 
  
 *  Wouter G. Werner is a professor in Public International Law at VU University in Ams-
terdam. His main fields of interest are international legal theory, the interplay between inter-
national law and international politics, and the international legal regime on the use of force. 
One of the focal points of his research is the turn to prevention and risk-management in 
contemporary security policies.  
 1 DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 125 (2006). 
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the exercise of power by sovereign states.2 In current debates, ―lawfare‖ is 
often used as a label to criticise those who use international law and legal 
proceedings to make claims against the state, especially in areas related to 
national security.3 In these contexts, ―lawfare‖ is almost invariably defined 
in negative terms, such as ―abuse of the law and legal systems for strategic 
political or military ends.‖4 In one of the more radical descriptions, lawfare 
is portrayed as a challenge to the strength of democratic nations, a ―strategy 
of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.‖5  
Of course, it is impossible to judge which of the strongly diverging 
definitions of lawfare is correct. The meanings of terms such as ―lawfare‖ 
are not set in stone, but rather, evolve through their use in different social 
practices.6 However, this does not mean that it is impossible to take a criti-
cal stand towards the different meanings that are attached to the concept of 
lawfare. The way in which social reality is defined has direct bearing on 
questions of responsibility—different conceptual lenses highlight and sup-
press different ways of organising legal, moral, and political responsibility.7 
In that sense, definitional issues are neither pointless nor arbitrary. This is 
why I choose to study and compare some different meanings attached to the 
concept of lawfare—not to discover its one true meaning, but to explore the 
different contexts in which the concept has been used and to set out how a 
particular way of framing ―lawfare‖ affects questions of legal, moral, and 
political accountability.  
In order to explore these issues, I will analyze four different uses of 
the concept of lawfare since the mid-1970s. The first section discusses how 
the term was used in new-age circles some thirty-five years ago and its radi-
cal transformation in the hands of Chinese military strategists. The second 
section examines the introduction of the concept in the early twenty-first 
century as part of a broader attempt to rethink the role of law in contempo-
rary warfare. There, I will focus on the writings of David Kennedy, who 
used the concept of lawfare to stimulate critical reflection on questions of 
  
 2 See THE LAWFARE PROJECT, http://www.thelawfareproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2010) (defining lawfare as ―the use of the law as a weapon of war, or more specifically, the 
abuse of the law and legal systems for strategic political or military ends.‖). 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
5 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf [hereinaf-
ter 2005 NAT‘L DEF. STRATEGY]. 
 6 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20e (G.E.M. Anscombe, 
trans., 1953) (―For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 
‗meaning‘ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.‖). 
 7 I thank Erna Rijsdijk for her never-ending efforts to point out how the social construc-
tion of reality affects issues of responsibility.  
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personal responsibility of those who are involved in the waging of war. The 
third section studies yet another way in which lawfare is used: as a label to 
fight those who invoke law and legal procedures against the state. In this 
context, the concept of lawfare is no longer used to induce self-critique and 
to rethink personal responsibility. Instead, the concept itself is turned into a 
political instrument that can be used to undermine the activities of legal and 
political opponents.   
II.  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT USES OF LAWFARE 
A. From Yin and Yang to Unrestricted Warfare  
One of the first texts in which the term ―lawfare‖ appeared was a 
book chapter by John Carlson and Neville Yeomans.8 In many respects, the 
chapter reflects the spirit of the 1970s. It advocates a legal culture based on 
―harmony, peace and love,‖ serving ―humanitar[ism], flexibility and intui-
tion‖ while balancing yin and yang in society.9 The authors lament the de-
velopment of secular law in ―the West‖ in the past 200 years—in less than 
eighteen pages—arguing that Western legal orders have become accusato-
rial, utilitarian, and rooted in self-interest.10 In this context, they introduce 
the concept of ―lawfare.‖ Although the concept is not defined anywhere, it 
is not difficult to see what the authors mean when they use the term ―law-
fare‖ in their attack on what they believe to be the essence of modern West-
ern law: ―The search for truth is replaced by the classification of issues and 
the refinement of combat. Lawfare replaces warfare and the duel is with 
words rather than swords.‖11 According to Carlson and Yeoman, the modern 
West should learn from traditional and Eastern cultures where lawsuits are 
regarded as disruptive of societal order and where disputes are settled in a 
more communal spirit.12 Initially, the term ―lawfare‖ thus served as a label 
to denounce individualistic and accusatorial aspects of law in Western so-
cieties. 
Given Carlson and Yeoman‘s plea for a turn to the East, it is ironic 
that the next mentions of lawfare can be found in a book called Unrestricted 
Warfare, written by two officers of the Chinese People´s Liberation Army, 
  
 8 John Carlson & Neville Yeomans, Whither Goeth the Law—Humanity or Barbarity, in 
THE WAY OUT—RADICAL ALTERNATIVES IN AUSTRALIA 155, 155 (Margaret Smith & David 
Crossley eds., 1975), available at http://www.laceweb.org.au/whi.htm. In this article, I will 
refer to the text published on Laceweb. For other earlier uses of the term see also the contri-
bution to this issue by Leila Sadat. 
 9 Carlson & Yeomans, supra note 8. 
 10 Id. at 2. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.13 Instead of striving for harmony, the au-
thors witness a trend towards unrestricted warfare and strongly advise China 
to come to terms with this new reality.14 Although Unrestricted Warfare is 
often mentioned as one of the earliest sources of the concept of lawfare, it 
should be noted that lawfare only plays marginal role in the book.15 It ap-
pears together with other alternative forms of warfare, including psycho-
logical warfare, smuggling warfare, media warfare, technological warfare, 
and economic aid warfare.16 Moreover, the only—and rather sketchy—
definition of ―lawfare‖ that can be found in the book emphasises the strate-
gic importance of being a trendsetter in international standards.17 According 
to the authors, ―lawfare‖ is about ―seizing the earliest opportunity to set up 
regulations.‖18 At the same time, Qiao has emphasised that powerful states 
such as the United States depend on existing normative frameworks for the 
exercise of its power. While the United States may break international rules, 
such as the prohibition on the use of force, Qiao argued, ―[the U.S.] has to 
observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it.‖19 
The concept of lawfare thus only appears at the margins of Unre-
stricted Warfare. However, the way in which lawfare is linked to the central 
argument of the book makes it important for the purposes of this article as 
well. The book‘s main argument is that the nature of war and warfare has 
undergone significant changes.20 This may sound like a cliché since numer-
ous books, articles, and reports already made the point that war has trans-
formed fundamentally in roughly the past fifty years.21 While the book in-
deed repeats many of the commonplaces regarding the new face of war, it 
  
 13 See QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI , UNRESTRICTED WARFARE (Beijing: PLA Literature 
and Arts Publishing House, Feb. 1999), available at http://redreform.com/unrestricted 
warfare.htm. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See LIANG & XIANGSUI, supra note 13. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Inter-
ventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human 
Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunla
p2001.pdf (discussing Dunlap‘s assertion that Liang and Xiangsu‘s book does not fully ad-
dress or define lawfare). 
 16 Id. at 42–43. 
 17 Id. at xxii. 
 18 Id. at 43. 
 19 Interview with Qiao Liang in the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, as referred to in the intro-
duction of the translation of ―Unrestricted Warfare,‖ supra note 9. 
 20 LIANG & XIANG SUI, supra note 13, at xviii–xxii. 
 21 See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR, THE MOST RADICAL 
REINTERPRETATION OF ARMED CONFLICT SINCE CLAUSEWITZ (1991); HERFRIED MÜNKLER, 
THE NEW WARS (Polity Press 2005) (2002); MARY KALDOR, OLD AND NEW WARS, 
ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Polity Press 2006) (1998). 
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also gives them specific meaning and force. For instance, the book‘s argu-
ment is not so much that ―war‖ as a separate social state is changing.22 The 
argument is that war has become inseparable from other societal institu-
tions, from society, economy, and politics in peacetime.23 Therefore, the 
title Unrestricted Warfare does not really capture what is at stake in the 
book‘s central argument. The argument is not only that the conduct of hos-
tilities has become unrestricted, it is that war itself has broken free from its 
traditional confines, that war has permeated all other sectors of society.24 
The authors‘ definition of war is illustrative in this respect. Consciously 
deviating from Clausewitz‘ definition of war in terms of armed force used 
to submit the enemy to one‘s own will, they define the ―new principles of 
war‖ as: ―using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, mili-
tary and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal to compel the enemy to ac-
cept one‘s interests. This represents change. A change in war and in the 
mode of war occasioned by this.‖25  
Not surprisingly, the authors subsequently argue that traditional dis-
tinctions between war and peace, combatant and non-combatant, just and 
unjust cause, and armed force and other non-violent instruments have be-
come obsolete.26 Under such an expansive concept of war, almost all those 
who hold different interests can be turned into enemies and all methods are 
potential weapons in war. War, Qiao and Wang contend, ―is increasingly 
becoming a matter for politicians, scientists, and even bankers . . . If those 
such as Morris, bin Laden and Soros can be considered as soldiers in the 
wars of tomorrow, then who isn‘t a soldier?‖27  
The second use of lawfare discussed here therefore appears in a 
context that sketches a disturbing picture of the war and warfare in the 
twenty-first century. The use of law is regarded as one of the many strate-
gies that can be used in a world-wide struggle where the dividing line be-
tween war and non-war is almost impossible to make. The use of law as a 
military tool, together with methods such as media warfare, drug warfare, 
fabrication warfare, cultural warfare, etcetera, illustrates that the relation-
ship between war and politics is turned upside down. According to Qiao and 
Wang, war is no longer the continuation of politics with the inclusion of 
other means; it is politics that has become the continuation—or even just 
one of the manifestations—of war.28  
  
 22 LIANG & XIANG SUI, supra note 13, at xx–xxii. 
 23 Id. at x–xiii. 
 24 Id. at xi–xxiii. 
 25 Id. at xxi–xxii. 
 26 Id. at 241–47. 
 27 LIANG & XIANG SUI, supra note 13, at 190–91 (―[W]arfare is in the process of tran-
scending the domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs‖). 
 28 Id. 
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B. Legalised War 
From the late 1990s on, the term ―lawfare‖ was introduced in a dif-
ferent context as well. In Charles Dunlap‘s writings, the concept of lawfare 
was used to make sense of the changing security environment in which mili-
taries—primarily Western—had to operate.29 While Qiao and Wang argued 
that war was breaking free from traditional limits, Dunlap witnessed un-
precedented legal restraints on the conduct of hostilities.30 In order to illus-
trate this point, Dunlap quotes the perspective of the former NATO supreme 
allied commander Europe, General Jones, who said: 
It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle . . . In a perfect world, 
a general would get up and say, ―Follow me, men‖, and everybody would 
say ―Aye, sir‖ and run off. But that‘s not the world anymore, . . . [now] 




The omnipresence of law in contemporary military affairs created 
new opportunities to fight enemies. Legal arrangements not only put limits 
on warfare, but also provide venues to legitimise the use of military force, to 
de-legitimise the enemy, and to supplement the use of force with less de-
structive—and less costly—means.32 It is therefore not surprising that the 
legalization of war went hand in hand with the strategic use of law as a way 
to fight the enemy. In this context, Dunlap defined ―lawfare‖ as ―the strate-
gy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means 
to achieve an operational objective.‖33 
It should be noted that for Dunlap the term ―lawfare‖ is not meant 
in a normative sense, as a way to express disapproval of the use of law as a 
strategic tool.34 For him, the use of legal proceedings or the mobilization of 
  
 29 Dunlap, supra note 15. 
 30 LIANG & XIANG SUI, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that the traditional definition of war can 
no longer be used to explain war today); Dunlap, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining the heavy 
presence of lawyers in warzones because of post-conflict investigations and the U.S.‘ com-
mitment to upholding human rights). 
 31 Lyric Wallwork Winik, A Marine‟s Toughest Mission, PARADE, Jan. 19, 2003, 
http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2003/edition_01-19-2003/General_Jones (quoting 
General James L. Jones, a former NATO commander, explaining how the legalistic nature of 
today‘s warfare has complicated the fight). 
 32 For a discussion see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. 
INT‘L. AFF. 146, 146–154 (2008). 
 33 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st—Century Conflicts?, 54 
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 34 (2009), at 2, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTR 
Doc?AD=ADA515192&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
 34 Id. 
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public concern about military operations is a perfectly legitimate activity.35 
Still, the strategic use of law does raise questions about the role and legiti-
macy of law in contemporary armed conflicts. What is left of the integrity 
of law and the responsibility of lawyers if legal provisions are turned into 
strategic tools to fight an enemy? Such questions figure prominently in Da-
vid Kennedy‘s study on the ―routinization of humanitarian law into the mili-
tary profession.‖36 For Kennedy, the notion of lawfare is useful in diagnos-
ing how the evolution of the law of armed conflict law has affected the re-
sponsibilities of humanitarians and the military.37 According to Kennedy, 
the law of armed conflict has grown into a common vocabulary to assess the 
legitimacy of war—or acts of war.38 Humanitarians are no longer outsiders 
who speak law to power, but have become ―professionals of war,‖ working 
in close relationship with bureaucrats, politicians, and the military to devel-
op legal standards for civilized warfare.39 However, since these standards 
are often underdetermined and flexible, these efforts yield a paradoxical 
result. The law of armed conflict provides a common vernacular to assess 
military operations, but at the same time leaves room for different and con-
flicting interpretations.40 The legalization of war, in other words, has made 
it easier to make opposing claims in a vocabulary that is understood global-
ly. The combination of universality and flexibility has fostered the use of 
the legal arguments as military tools and turned the law of armed conflict 
into a ―strategic vernacular‖ that combines normativity with instrumental 
rationality.41 In this context, Kennedy introduces the concept of lawfare as 
the art of ―managing law and war together.‖42  
Thus, Kennedy uses the notion of lawfare to address some funda-
mental concerns regarding the role of law in military affairs. The first con-
cern is that a widely shared strategic attitude toward humanitarian law may 
eventually undermine the normative force of law.43 Specifically, if all par-
ties concerned believe that legal arguments are produced merely to gain 
military or political advantage, the integrity of law is at stake. Debates on 
the legality or illegality of behaviour then turn into a ―dialogue of the deaf,  
  
 35 Dunlap, supra note 15, at 148 (―[C]oncern from the public, NGO‘s, academics, legisla-
tures, and the courts about the behaviour of militaries is more than simply a public relations 
problem; it is a legitimate and serious activity that is totally consistent with adherence to the 
rule of law, democratic values and—for that matter—lawfare.‖). 
 36 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 41. 
 37 Id. at 37. 
 38 Id. at 39. 
 39 Id. at 28–33. 
 40 Id. at 25. 
 41 Id. at 116. 
 42 Id. at 125. 
 43 Id. at 135. 
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. . . as we use the discourse more, we believe it less—at least when spoken 
by others.‖44 The second concern is that personal responsibility for deci-
sions regarding the lethal use of force is replaced by legal calculus and legal 
judgment.45 One of the effects of the legalization of war may then be the 
erosion of a sense of personal responsibility, the transformation of free deci-
sions into judgments that result from ―the abstract operation of professional 
principles.‖46 
Kennedy thus voices two seemingly contradictory concerns about 
lawfare. On the one hand, there is the concern that the credibility and inde-
pendence of legal arguments is undermined by their strategic use. On the 
other hand, the concern is that legal arguments are taken too seriously and 
used as the endpoint of normative deliberations. Both points, however, ad-
dress the same basic idea: that humanitarians and militaries should ac-
knowledge their freedom to take responsible decisions on the use of lethal 
force, including the decision to use law as a strategic tool.  
C. Reflexive Lawfare 
The legalization of politics and war gave rise to yet another use of 
the term ―lawfare.‖ ―In the past quarter century,‖ Goldsmith wrote in a 2002 
memo for the Bush administration, ―various nations, NGO‘s, academics, 
international organizations, and others in the international community have 
been busily weaving a web of international and judicial institutions that 
today threatens USG interests.‖47 Goldsmith expressed a deeply felt concern 
in the U.S. administration that the legalization of world politics, for exam-
ple, via the expansion of universal jurisdiction and the proliferation of inter-
national tribunals, would hamper effective measures in the fight against 
terrorism.48Victim groups and human rights advocates soon learned how to 
utilize the newly opened up venues for legal action.49 Even where attempts 
to hold former officials legally accountable do not result in actual cases 
before a court, they generally create media activity and spur public debate 
about the legitimacy of specific governmental operations.50 Under the Bush 
Administration, the fear for legal action even reached a point where re-
course to international fora and international law by opponents was de-
  
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 144 
 46 Id. 
 47 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 60 (W.W. Norton & Company 2009). 
 48 Id. at 59. 
 49 Id. at 58–61. 
 50 Id. at 62–63. 
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nounced as a strategy of the weak, just like the use of instruments such as 
terrorism.51  
In order to fight the use of law by critics of the government, the 
term ―lawfare‖ was taken up again. The way in which lawfare was then 
often used, however, implied a significant change in its meaning and pur-
pose.52 Lawfare was still used to describe the increasing judicialization of 
war and politics.53 At the same time, lawfare was used as an instrument to 
discredit critics of the government.54 The concept of lawfare was thereby 
transformed from an analytical tool to capture the changing relation be-
tween law and war into a weapon actually involved in political and military 
struggles. Invoking the term ―lawfare‖ had become a strategic move itself—
an alternative form of warfare that, for lack of a better term, may be called 
―reflexive lawfare.‖ ―Reflexive lawfare‖ can be defined as ―the use of the 
term ‗lawfare‘ to discredit an opponent‘s reliance on law and legal proce-
dure.‖55 If it would not be too much of a sophism, one may define ―reflexive 
lawfare‖ also as ―the use of the term ‗lawfare‘ as an instrument of law-
fare.‖56 
The transformation of lawfare is visible in at least three interrelated 
aspects. First, those who use ―lawfare‖ as a stigma for their opponents apply 
it almost exclusively to actions of critics or enemies of a particular govern-
ment—in practice mostly the United States and Israel.57 This strongly de-
viates from the way in which scholars such as Dunlap or Kennedy have 
used the concept. Kennedy, for example, used ―lawfare‖ to analyse how all 
those who are involved in modern wars use law as a strategic tool.58 In simi-
lar fashion, Dunlap sets out how the military and humanitarians, states and 
non-state actors, as well as national officials and international organizations 
  
 51 Id. at 64. 
 52 David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2020 
(2007–2008). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 2021 (denouncing the efforts of lawyers defending those accused of terrorist acts); 
Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush‟s War on the Rule of Law, HARPER‘S, July 2007, at 
74, 74 http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0081595. 
 55 See Horton, supra note 54. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See Anne Herzberg, Lawfare Against Israel, Wall Street Journal Europe, Nov. 5, 2008, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122583394143998285.html (An opinion article 
on frivolous exploitation of lawsuits in furtherance of a ―lawfare‖ strategy against Israel); 
See also Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The Chilling Effect of „Lawfare‟ Litigation, 
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commenisfree/liberty 
central/2010/feb/09/libel-forum-radical-islamic-groups (citing a recent ACLU‘s recent law 
suit in the United States). 
 58 DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 125 (2006).    
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engage in lawfare.59 Those who use lawfare as a stigma, however, tend to be 
silent about the strategic use of law by governments and the military, focus-
ing instead on the possible negative effects of the invocation of law and 
legal procedure by opponents of a particular government.60  
Secondly, the strategic use of law is presented predominantly in a 
negative light, as an unfair and dangerous way to frustrate legitimate gov-
ernments.61 This is a far cry from the way in which Dunlap and Kennedy 
used the concept. For Dunlap, the strategic use of law is not negative by 
definition, as it may be part of a legitimate activity that promotes democrat-
ic values and the rule of law.62 Kennedy too, while voicing concerns about 
the effects of lawfare, did not denounce the use of law as a strategic tool per 
se.63 On the contrary, he warned against attempts to project the invocation 
of law by one‘s opponents as purely cynical, strategic moves, as this would 
eventually undermine the integrity of law.64 
Thirdly, the use of ―lawfare‖ is largely decoupled from critical self-
reflection. For Kennedy, acknowledging the importance of lawfare also 
confronted him with the possible downsides of his own previous efforts to 
civilize war.65 His ultimate aim was to propel a process of critical self-
reflection about the personal responsibility of humanitarians and military.66 
For those who use lawfare as a stigma, however, the primary aim is not to 
take a fresh and critical look at their own position and responsibility.67 This 
is not to say that they turn a blind-eye to issues of responsibility. They will 
  
 59 See Dunlap, supra note 33, at 36 (describing al-Qaeda‘s use of lawfare and recent media 
reports on the Taliban). 
 60 See generally, Anne Herzberg, NGO Laware, Exploitation of Courts in the Israeli-Arab 
Conflict, NGO MONITOR MONOGRAPH SERIES, September 2008, available at http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/data/images/File/lawfare-monograph.pdf. 
 61 See THE LAWFARE PROJECT, supra note 2; see also 2005 NAT‘L DEF. STRATEGY, supra 
note 5. 
 62 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law and Asso-
ciate Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Presented at Case Western 
University School of Law Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research 
Symposium, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia? (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.au. 
af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0520/0520Articles/Dunlap0520.pdf. 
 63 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 41 (―But if law can increase friction by persuading relevant 
audiences of a campaign‘s illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels of combat.  Law is a 
strategic partner for military commanders when it increases the perception of outsiders that 
what the military is doing is legitimate.  And of course, it is a strategic partner for the war‘s 
opponents when it increases the perception that what the military is doing is not legitimate.‖). 
 64 Id. at 41 (―Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when it increases the 
perception of outsiders that what the military is doing is legitimate.‖). 
 65 Id. at 8 (demonstrating the author‘s attempt to reconcile the laws of war, such as when a 
military is entitled to kill civilians, with human rights concerns). 
 66 Id. (―May the human freedom of responsible decision be the vocation of our politics.‖).  
 67 See, e.g., Herzberg, supra note 60 (using ―lawfare‖ with a negative connotation). 
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feel, for example, that protecting a particular nation against terrorist threats 
is the ultimate responsibility, which may require far-reaching and unpopular 
measures.68 Using lawfare as a stigma, however, has little to do with devel-
oping a critical stance towards one‘s own role and responsibility. On the 
contrary, the label ―lawfare‖ is primarily used to communicate that others 
are acting irresponsibly because they use law to frustrate governments fight-
ing for a good cause.69  
This is not to say that the use of law and legal proceedings can nev-
er be criticized. There are many good reasons to follow attempts to legalize 
world politics and to point at possible risks and dark sides of using law as an 
instrument to settle political disputes.70 However, using lawfare as a label to 
discredit opponents of a specific government contributes little to a better 
understanding of the pros and cons of using law and legal procedure in a 
particular context. Instead, it blinds us for the omnipresence of law in con-
temporary wars and for the ways all parties concerned use legal arguments 
strategically. Moreover, it seduces us to take a comfortable, but limited 
view on responsibility: it does not invite us to think critically about our own 
role and responsibility, but only helps us to discredit those who we believed 
were wrong in the first place. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
This essay has examined the curious career of lawfare: how the 
concept was borne in new age circles, reappeared more than two decades 
later in reflections on unrestricted warfare, how it travelled from the U.S. 
army to critical legal studies, and how it ended up in the hands of those who 
use it primarily to discredit opponents of particular governments.  
The aim of this exercise has not been to discover the one true mean-
ing of ―lawfare.‖ After all, meaning is not pre-given but produced and re-
produced in specific social contexts. This is not to say that we should be 
indifferent to the ways in which concepts are used. In terms of what is hig-
hlighted and what it suppressed, it matters a great deal how a concept is 
used and defined. In this context, I have voiced concern about the move 
towards reflexive lawfare—the use of the term ―lawfare‖ as an instrument to 
de-legitimise opponents. This way of using lawfare gives a one-sided pers-
pective on the role of law in contemporary conflicts. It largely neglects the 
many ways in which governments and the military use law strategically and 
presents the recourse to law and legal procedure as something negative. 
  
 68 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 129. 
 69 See, e.g., id. 
 70 See Sarah Nouwen & Wouter Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21(4) EUR. J. OF INT‘L L. (forthcoming 2011). 
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Therefore, it risks undermining the integrity of law and closing off debates 
about accountability for the use of lethal force.  
This is not to say that we should abandon the concept of lawfare al-
together. ―Lawfare‖ is a powerful term that captures the omnipresence of 
law in the wars of the late 20th and early 21st century. It signals that argu-
ments about the irrelevance of law in issues of high politics have lost touch 
with the realities of contemporary warfare. Moreover, it indicates that law is 
not just a restraining force, but rather a symbolic order that helps to socially 
construct, legitimise, and assess the use of lethal force. Lawfare does not 
need to be turned into an instrument for political and military struggles. It 
can also form the starting point for research into the complex ways in which 
law and war are related nowadays, and the questions of responsibility that 
result from this.  
 
